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Abstract 
 
Batabyal and Yoo (2019) have recently obtained a significant result in their analysis of the use of 
utilitarian and Rawlsian policies by two cities to attract the creative class. They show that if one city 
switches to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective when the other city remains utilitarian, the aggregate 
economy of two cities becomes less egalitarian. We show that this result depends fundamentally on the 
assumption that the creative class population can be described by a triangular probability distribution. If 
this population is modeled instead with an inverted triangular probability distribution then the above 
result is reversed in the sense that the welfare of the worst-off member of the creative class is always 
enhanced when one city switches to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective, irrespective of the objective 
of the other city.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 The urbanist Richard Florida (2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2014) has contended in a number of 
research contributions that cities and regions that want to flourish in this era of globalization need to do 
all they can to attract and retain members of the so called creative class who are, we are told, the principal 
drivers of economic growth and development. Once one accepts Florida’s assertion that cities seeking to 
prosper economically need to attract members of the creative class, the next logical question is the 
following: “How are cities to do this?” Florida (2002, 2008), Buettner and Janeba (2016) and Batabyal et 
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al. (2019) have answered this query by demonstrating that cities can utilize local public goods such as 
cultural amenities, quality schools, and public transit to effectively carry out the “attract” function. 
(Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of this issue should consult Audretsch and Belitski 
(2013) and Batabyal and Nijkamp (2016)).  
 
In an interesting recent contribution, Batabyal and Yoo (2019) have shed light on the question 
posed in the preceding paragraph by analyzing the competition between two cities that use utilitarian and 
Rawlsian policies to attract the creative class. Inter alia, these researchers show that if one city switches 
to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective when the other city remains utilitarian, the aggregate economy 
of two cities becomes less egalitarian. Given this finding, our objective in this paper is to show that this 
result obtained by Batabyal and Yoo (2019) depends essentially on the assumption that the creative class 
population can be described by a triangular probability distribution function. If this population is modeled 
instead with an inverted triangular probability distribution function then the Batabyal and Yoo (2019) 
result mentioned above is reversed in the sense that the welfare of the worst-off member of the creative 
class is always enhanced when one city switches to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective, regardless 
of the objective of the other city.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates our model of an 
aggregate economy consisting of two cities that builds on Batabyal and Yoo (2019). Note that for ease of 
comparison with the results obtained by Batabyal and Yoo (2019), the notation we use in our paper is the 
same as that used by these two researchers. The creative class of interest to us is made up of a 
heterogeneous group of individuals possessing creative capital. Section 3 analyzes the welfare of the 
worst-off individual in the creative class in the case where one city switches from a utilitarian to a 
Rawlsian policy regardless of the objective of the other city. Section 4 concludes and then suggests two 
ways in which the research described in this paper might be extended.  
 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
 
Consider an aggregate economy of two cities denoted by  Each of these two cities 
competes for members of the creative class with its choice of a particular policy. Note that we are using 
the word “policy” in a general way. As such, one such policy could be how much to provide of a local 
public good as in Batabyal et al. (2019) and a second policy might be how much funding to make 
available to creative class members wishing to undertake one or more entrepreneurial ventures. The 
policy choice of city  is represented by a point  on the closed interval   
 
Creative class members differ in their preference for alternate policies put in place by cities  and 
 In particular, a creative class member of type  who elects to live in city  with policy  obtains utility 
given by the quadratic function  
 
      (1) 
 
Clearly, equation (1) tells us that a type  creative class member’s preferred policy is  In contrast to 
Batabyal and Yoo (2019), we suppose that the distribution of the creative class population can be 
described by an inverted triangular probability distribution function on the closed interval  (See Cui 
(2018, pp. 38-39) for additional details on the inverted triangular probability distribution function). Given 
the policy choice of each city, each creative class member selects the city with the policy that is closer to 
his most preferred policy. Finally, the equilibrium of interest to us has two aspects to it. First, no city 
wishes to change its policy given the policy of the other city. Second, no creative class member wishes to 
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move given the policy choices of the two cities. With this description of our aggregate economy of two 
cities out of the way, our next task is to analyze the welfare of the worst-off individual in the creative 
class in the case where one city switches from a utilitarian to a Rawlsian policy regardless of the objective 
of the other city.  
 
3. Move from a Utilitarian to a Rawlsian Policy 
 
3.1. Utilitarian policies 
 
 Each city selects its policy in accordance with a utilitarian criterion. Specifically, this means that 
city  maximizes the sum of the utilities of the creative class members who live in city  Now, 
using the symmetry of the distribution of the preferences of the creative class members and the symmetry 
of the city objective function, we infer that in the equilibrium, the creative class population will be 
equally divided between cities  and   
 
The optimal policy choice of the utilitarian city  is given by solving  
 
     (2) 
 
where  is the density function. The inverted triangular probability distribution function is given by  
 
     (3) 
 
Using equation (3) we can simplify city  objective function given in equation (2). This gives us 
 
    (4) 
 
Integrating the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (4), we can rewrite city  objective function as  
 
      (5) 
 
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to  and then simplifying the resulting expression gives 
us the utilitarian solution for city  We get  
 
     (6) 
 
Now, by symmetry, the utilitarian solution for city  is  
        (7) 
 
We now proceed to address the case in which the two cities adopt Rawlsian policies.  
 
3.2. Rawlsian policies 
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 When city  adopts a Rawlsian policy, it maximizes the minimum utility of the creative class 
members who are resident in city  Straightforward computations show that in this case, the 
analysis is unchanged from the analysis conducted by Batabyal and Yoo (2019). In other words, the actual 
policy choice of city  is  and that of city  is  In addition, the creative class 
population is equally divided between the two cities.  
 
Note that in the Rawlsian case, the two cities choose policies that are at the midpoint of the 
preferences of the creative class members who choose to live in these two cities. As shown in figure 1, 
this gives us the numerical policy choices of   and the letter “R” denotes Rawlsian. 
In contrast, when the two cities pursue utilitarian policies, they choose policies that are at the center of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0                                                                                                                                          1 
                    1        1                                                                                                3        5 
                    6        4                                                                                                4        6 
                    U       R                                                                                               R       U 
 
Figure 1: Rawlsian and utilitarian policy choices 
 
gravity of the preferences of the creative class members who live in these same two cities. Figure 1 shows 
that this gives us the numerical policy choices of   and the letter “U” denotes 
utilitarian. Note that because we have chosen to delineate the distribution of the creative class population 
with the inverted triangular probability distribution function, the distance between the optimal policy 
choices in the utilitarian case (  is bigger than the corresponding distance in the 
Rawlsian case (  Let us now proceed to analyze the case where one city switches 
from a utilitarian to a Rawlsian policy regardless of the policy objective of the other city.  
 
3.3. The switch 
 
 Without loss of generality, suppose that city  uses a Rawlsian policy and that city  pursues a 
utilitarian policy. We now make two claims. First,  represents the creative class member who is 
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indifferent between living in the two cities. Second, city  Rawlsian policy involves choosing 
 and city  utilitarian policy involves selecting   
 
To demonstrate the validity of the two claims in the preceding paragraph, let us begin by using  
to denote the creative class member who is indifferent between living in either the Rawlsian city  or the 
utilitarian city  Then we know that city  will choose its policy to minimize the distance for its worst-
off creative class member. This means that city  policy choice will be   
 
Moving on to city  this utilitarian city will select a policy that is at the center of gravity of the 
closed interval  Note that because we are modeling the creative class population distribution in our 
aggregate economy with the inverted triangular distribution, this center of gravity will always be closer to 
1 than to  In other words, the use of the inverted triangular distribution function means that more of the 
creative class population is closer to 1 than to  Now, the equilibrium policy choice of the utilitarian city 
 will be  because we need the indifferent creative class member denoted by  to be equidistant 
from the two policy choices of  and  This constraint and the utilitarian objective function given 
in equation (1) together tell us that the solution we seek is  and the creative class 
member who is indifferent between living in the two cities is denoted by  This solution is 
illustrated in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   0             0.28                                                                                                         0.84            1 
                    R                                                                                                             U 
Figure 2:  Policy choice leading to a more egalitarian aggregate economy 
 
 Our analysis thus far allows us to draw four conclusions. First, compared to the triangular 
distribution function utilized by Batabyal and Yoo (2019), the use of the inverted triangular distribution 
function results in the shifting of the policy choices to the extremes of the distribution when the two cities 
are utilitarian. Second, this division in the two policy choices arises because of a shift in the center of 
gravity which is now closer to the extremes of the distribution than to its center. This shifting of the center 
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of gravity results from the fact that more of the creative class population is now close to either 0 or 1 than 
to  Third, with the inverted triangular distribution, the maximum distance of any creative class 
member from his preferred policy choice is 0.33  in the pure utilitarian 
case, 0.28  in the part-Rawlsian part-utilitarian case, and 0.25 
(  in the pure Rawlsian case. Finally, the preceding three conclusions 
together tell us that when we use the inverted triangular distribution and not the triangular distribution to 
model the distribution of the creative class population, the switch of one city to a Rawlsian or more 
egalitarian objective always enhances the utility of the worst-off member of the creative class irrespective 
of the objective of the other city. This completes our analysis of a probabilistic model of competition 
between two cities for members of the creative class. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
 In this paper we extended the recent work of Batabyal and Yoo (2019) who studied the 
competition between two cities to attract the creative class using utilitarian and Rawlsian policies. These 
researchers showed that if one city switched to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective when the other 
city remained utilitarian, the aggregate economy of two cities became less egalitarian. We first pointed 
out that this result depended fundamentally on the assumption that the creative class population can be 
effectively described by a triangular probability distribution function. Next, we showed that if this 
population is modeled instead with an inverted triangular probability distribution then the above result is 
reversed in the sense that the welfare of the worst-off member of the creative class is always enhanced 
when one city switches to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective, no matter what the objective of the 
other city.  
 
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what follows, 
we suggest two possible extensions. First, it would be useful to model the interaction between the creative 
class and the two cities as a cooperative game in which the two cities cooperate among themselves in one 
or more ways when they seek to attract members of the creative class to their respective cities. Second, it 
would also be instructive to embed the aggregate economy of two cities analyzed here in a dynamic 
environment in which it is possible for one or both cities to switch between utilitarian and Rawlsian 
policies over time. Studies that examine these facets of the underlying problem will provide further 
insights into the roles that members of the creative class can play in expanding the economic well-being 
of cities.  
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